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Abstract: Copyright Collecting Societies have proliferated, with more than 150 
organisations now collecting and distributing licensing fees for rights in music, 
literary, audio-visual and graphic works within the European Union. From the 
perspective of Competition Law, collecting societies may be viewed as price-fixing 
cartels under Art. 81 EC, and as vulnerable to challenges under Art. 82 EC (i.e. 
abusing a dominant position as the sole provider of a management infrastructure to 
right holders, and as the only supplier of licences to copyright users). Yet, collective 
administration of copyright has important policy benefits:  (i) From a user 
perspective, collecting societies may offer a single point licence providing easy and 
wide access to copyright protected contents. This can be a solution to innovation 
issues in an information society where major right holders otherwise may dictate 
problematic terms. (ii) Creators at the margins of commercial viability have access to 
a mechanism of collective bargaining against major rights exploiters, such as 
publishers, record labels and broadcasters. This may support a culturally diverse 
society. This article develops principles for regulating the collective management of 
copyrights from a critique of EC competition jurisprudence. 
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Copyright collecting societies are complex institutions. Outsiders, and even insiders, 
have found it difficult to understand the rights they manage as well as their tariff and 
distribution structures. The principles governing the relationship between licensors 
and licensees are poorly articulated. Yet, by providing access to information goods 
and rewarding creators and investors of copyright-protected materials, collecting 
societies are integral to the structure of an information society. 
 
Copyright societies have been likened to joint ventures, trustees, mutual societies and 
collecting agents. In some countries, they are constituted as corporate non-profit 
organisations (UK), in others they may operate under a government monopoly grant 
(Austria, Italy, Japan). Most European societies are somewhat in the middle, 
constituted as private membership associations but subject to close regulatory 
supervision. This may include formal permissions to operate a collecting society, 
statutory obligations regarding membership rules, accounting procedures and 
licensing conditions, or tariffs set directly by government (e.g. levies on blank tapes, 
recordable discs and copying equipment).1 
 
In the UK, there are currently 13 collective licensing bodies, some managing very 
valuable primary rights, such as the music rights to public performance and 
broadcasting assigned to the Performing Right Society PRS, or the right to make and 
distribute recordings for which the Mechanical-Copyright Protection Society MCPS 
acts as exclusive agent. The largest societies exercise considerable economic clout. In 
                                                
1 For surveys of the different constitutions of European Collecting Societies, see Carine Doutrelepont, 
Le contrôle des sociétés de gestion des droits d’auteur et des droits voisins dans la Communauté 
européenne (Brussels: Bruylant, 1995); Paul Katzenberger, ‘Die verschiedenen Systeme des 
Aufsichtsrechts über die kollektive Verwertung von Urheberrechten in den europäischen Staaten’, pp. 
1-15 in R.M. Hilty ed. (1995) Die Verwertung von Urheberrechten in Europa; KEA report 
commissioned by European Parliament The Collective Management of Rights in Europe (July 2006). 
For an international comparative study from a Canadian perspective, see Daniel J. Gervais, ‘Collective 
Management of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights in Canada: An International Perspective’ (2002) 
1(2) Canadian Journal of Law and Technology 21-50. The European Commission is not particularly 
concerned about the legal status of collecting societies which ‘may be corporate, charitable, for profit 
or not for profit entities’ (Communication COM(2004) 261: The Management of Copyright and 
Related Rights in the Internal Market, para 3.5.1). 
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2006, the international umbrella body Confédération Internationale des Sociétés 
d’Auteurs et Compositeurs (CISAC) had 217 members from 114 countries, with a 
total annual turnover of more than €6,5 billion.2 
 
From the perspective of European competition law, collecting societies prima facie 
appear extremely problematic. As Aitman and Jones suggest: ‘The Commission is 
generally hostile to any form of collective selling or sales ventures, selling the 
products of competing manufacturers, as they restrict competition between the 
parents on the supply side and limit the choice of purchasers. They are effectively 
horizontal price fixing agreements prohibited by Art. 81(1) when they have an 
appreciable effect on the market.’3 
 
Thus it may seem surprising that collecting societies feature heavily in EU copyright 
policies. Some rights harmonised by Directives, such as the rental right, cable 
retransmission and the droit d’suite may only be exercised through collecting 
societies.4 Recital (17) of the Information Society Directive singles out the need for 
efficient collective administration.5 
                                                
2 Data available on the CISAC website (www.cisac.org). The UK collective licensing bodies are: 
Authors Licensing & Collecting Society (ALCS) - administers certain rights in the literary and 
dramatic copyright area (payments 2003: £12,6 million); Christian Copyright Licensing International 
(CCLI) - licenses the reproduction of songs and hymns; Copyright Licensing Agency (CLA) - licenses 
reprographic copying of literary works; Design and Artists Copyright Society (DACS) - administers 
reproduction rights for visual artists (revenues 2003: £3m); Educational Recording Agency Ltd (ERA) 
- licenses recording off-air by educational establishments; The International Federation of the 
Phonographic Industry (IFPI) - licenses use of foreign sound recordings not commercially available in 
the UK; Mechanical-Copyright Protection Society (MCPS) - licenses the making and distribution of 
sound recordings (payments 2003: £226 million); Newspaper Licensing Agency (NLA) - issues 
licences for copying of newspapers; Performing Artists’ Media Rights Association (PAMRA) - 
collects and distributes royalties to performers for use of sound recordings; Performing Right Society 
(PRS) – licenses public performances and broadcasting of music (revenues 2003: £283 million; 
payments 2003: £242 million); Phonographic Performance Limited (PPL) - licenses certain uses of 
copyright sound recordings; Publishers Licensing Society (PLS) - administers certain rights on behalf 
of publishers; Video Performance Limited (VPL) - licenses certain uses of music video recordings 
(source: annual reports). By my own estimate, there are currently more than 150 collecting societies 
acting for right holders in the EU alone (about 65 core music licensing societies, about 40 core 
reprographic societies licensing printed materials and numerous miscellaneous collective managers).  
Europe’s largest society is Germany’s GEMA (administering music performing and mechanical rights) 
with an annual turnover exceeding €800m (annual report 2003). 
3 D. Aitman and A. Jones, ‘Competition Law and Copyright: Has the copyright owner lost the ability 
to control his copyright?’ (2004), 3 European Intellectual Property Review 137-147, at 144. 
4 Article 4, Council Directive 1992/100 on the rental right and lending right and on certain rights 
related to copyright in the field of intellectual property; Article 9, Council Directive 1993/83 on the 
coordination of certain rules concerning copyright and rights related to copyright applicable to 
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In this article, I argue that the policy attraction of collective licensing in a digital 
environment consists in two features:  
From a user perspective, collecting societies may offer a single point 
licence providing easy and wide access. This can be a solution to 
innovation issues in the information society where major right 
holders otherwise may dictate problematic terms.  
 
Creators at the margins of commercial viability have access to a 
mechanism of collective bargaining against major rights 
exploiters, such as publishers, record labels and broadcasters. 
This may be an important support mechanism in fostering a 
culturally diverse society. 
 
The European Courts and the European Commission have been unable to articulate 
these important aims clearly, perhaps because they cannot be easily placed within the 
framework of Community competencies. (a) Copyright as a territorial right is asserted 
and enforced nationally. Limitations on the exclusive nature of intellectual property 
can only be placed where the exercise of intellectual property rights conflicts with the 
free movement of goods and the rules of competition.6 (b) A common cultural policy 
is not a recognised Community activity under Article 3 EC Treaty, although the 
Maastricht additions to Article 3 (1992) recognise ‘a contribution … to the flowering 
of cultures of the Member States’.7  
 
                                                                                                                                      
satellite broadcasting and cable retransmission; Article 6, Council Directive 2001/84 on the resale 
right for the benefit of the author of an original work of art.  
5 Council Directive 2001/29 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in 
the information society, Recital (17): ‘It is necessary, especially in the light of the requirements arising 
out of the digital environment, to ensure that collecting societies achieve a higher level of 
rationalisation and transparency with regard to compliance with competition rules.’ The ambition to 
incorporate the regulation of copyright societies into the Information Society Directive was indicated 
in the 1995 Green Paper Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society (COM(95) 382) but 
later dropped. 
6 In Lagardère v SPRE, GVL and CERT (Case C-192/04; judgment of 14 July 2005) concerning a 
broadcasting signal directed at the French market but using terrestrial transmitters in French and 
German territory, the ECJ reaffirmed the territorial nature of copyright and related rights ‘which is 
recognised in international law and also in the EC Treaty’. The legislation of both states was applicable 
in determining equitable remuneration for the performers and producers of phonograms. The opinion 
of AG Tizzano (at para 61) refers to Article 11bis of the Berne Convention (Paris Act 1971) stating 
that ‘it shall be a matter for the legislation in the countries of the Union [established by the 
Convention] to determine the conditions under which the rights [in question] may be exercised, but 
these conditions shall apply only in the countries where they have been prescribed’. 
7 A new Article 151 also provides that cultural aspects must be ‘taken into account’ in Community 
actions (including developing single market and competition policies). 
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The argument in this paper is structured to expose the roots of this tension. In section 
two, I briefly introduce the historical shape of collecting societies, in particular 
‘transaction cost’ and ‘solidarity’ explanations of their origins are advanced, and the 
dilemma of joint creator and investor representation is explicated. In section three, I 
review the jurisprudence of Commission and European Courts over three decades 
with respect to the collecting societies. In a nutshell, collecting societies are dominant 
economic undertakings subject to the rules of competition. They have to provide user 
licences on reasonable terms, and give their members maximum freedom to 
administer their rights individually consistent with the societies’ function. However, I 
show that the societies’ function cannot be easily articulated in competition terms. In 
section four, recent regulatory measures proposed by the European Commission are 
set in this context (in particular: Communication COM(2004) 261 The Management 
of Copyright and Related Rights in the Internal Market; Staff Working Document 
Study on a Community Initiative on the Cross-Border Collective Management of 
Copyright, 7 July 2005; Commission Recommendation On the Collective Cross-
border Management of Copyright and Related Rights for Legitimate Online Music 
Services, adopted 12 October 2005). It is argued that the management of copyright 
and related rights should be placed in the context of innovation policy in culturally 




Characteristics of Collecting Societies 
The origins of collective administration may appear as a straightforward response to a 
problem of transaction costs. An evocative story recounts the visit of Ernest Bourget, 
a French composer of popular chansons and chansonettes comiques, to the Paris café 
Ambassadeurs in 1847 where, among other pieces, his music was being played 
without permission. He then refused to settle the bill for his drink of sugared water, at 
the time a fashionable beverage. In the resulting brawl, M. Bourget argued ‘you 
consume my music, I consume your wares’ – an argument he won before the 
Tribunal de Commerce de la Seine which upheld a revolutionary law of 1793, 
recognising a right to public performance for the first time.8 
                                                
8 The French Acts of 1791 (regarding performances of theatre and musical drama) and 1793 (regarding 
the sale and dissemination of artistic works of any genre) replaced the old system of publishers’ rights 
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Ernest Bourget understood that as an individual composer he should not devote his 
life to chasing unauthorised performances of his music. Vice versa, each venue 
performing popular music would incur considerable costs in tracking and negotiating 
with various holders of the relevant performing rights. The solution to the failures of 
individual contracting was collective administration, combining a comprehensive 
monitoring service of music usage with a facility to issue licenses, i.e. permissions to 
play against remuneration. Ernest Bourget, his colleagues Victor Parizot and Paul 
Henrion as well as the publisher Jules Colombier founded an Agence Centrale, the 
direct predecessor of the first modern collecting society Société des Auteurs et 
Compositeurs et Editeurs de Musique (SACEM). SACEM, established in 1851, 
became the European model, collecting at times even in Switzerland, Belgium and the 
UK.  
 
Transaction cost economics recognises that there are costs of using markets, such as 
as information costs, contract costs and governance costs.9 In the case of copyright, 
transaction costs may include (a) identifying and locating the owner, (b) negotiating a 
price (this includes information and time costs), (c) monitoring and enforcement 
costs. The sparse economic literature on collecting societies tends to accept a 
transaction cost rationale for their existence.10 
 
                                                                                                                                      
with a system of authors’ rights. For details of the Bourget case, see F. Melichar Die Wahrnehmung 
von Urheberrechten durch Verwertungsgesellschaften (München: Schweitzer, 1983). 
9 Thus, under certain conditions, non-market structures (such as integrating economic activities into 
the hierarchy of a firm) can be more efficient than individual contracting.  O.E. Williamson, Markets 
and Hierarchies: Analysis and antitrust implications (New York: Free Press, 1975); O.E. Williamson, 
The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, markets, relational contracts (New York: Free Press, 
1985). 
10 A. Hollander ‘Market Structure and Performance in Intellectual Property: The Case of Copyright 
Collectives’ (1984) 2 International Journal of Industrial Organization 199-216; S.M. Besen and S.N. 
Kirby Compensating Creators of Intellectual Property: Collectives that collect (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND, 1989); S.M. Besen, S.N. Kirkby and S.C. Salop ‘An Economic Analysis of Copyright 
Collectives’ (1992) 78 Virginia LR 383; John Kay ‘The Economics of Intellectual Property Rights’ 
(1993) 13 International Review of Law and Economics 337-348; Ruth Towse ‘Copyright as an 
Economic Incentive’, in ‘Innovation, Incentive and Reward: Intellectual Property Law and Policy’ 
(1997) 5(1) David Hume Papers on Public Policy 31-45; Jeremy Thorpe (1998), ‘Regulating the 
Collective Exploitation of Copyright’ (1998) in special issue: Trade and Intellectual Property (ed. P. 
Drahos), 16(3) Prometheus 317-329; W.M. Landes and R.A. Posner The Economic Structure of 
Intellectual Property Law, chapter 14 (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap/Harvard, 2003). 
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Under collective administration, there is typically only one supplier of licences to the 
user of copyright works in one particular domain of rights (such as public 
performances). Reciprocal agreements with sister societies in other countries ensure 
that access to ‘the world repertoire’ can be granted through one licence. From the 
perspective of individual owners of copyright works, there may be no alternative 
provider of a rights administration infrastructure. In consequence, market prices 
cannot form either for licences to users nor for services to right holders.11  
 
This monopolistic structure leaves copyright collecting societies in control of the 
terms of access and royalty distribution in their particular rights domain. In many 
areas of collective licensing, administrative costs are extremely high. The cost of 
collection may amount to a quarter of revenues - while for other complex services 
(such as health insurance) administrative deductions of 5% are seen as high.12  
 
The tendency of collective administration to evolve into self-serving bureaucracies 
sheltered from competition has led to increasing state involvement in the supervision 
of collecting societies. As a general rule, collecting societies in all EU Member States 
cannot refuse to license their repertoire; they have to admit members subject to 
certain threshold rules; and they have to give some kind of public account of their 
finances. 
                                                
11 One strand of commentators has located the inefficiencies in collective administration in the nature 
of liability rules: R.P. Merges ‘Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and 
Collective Rights Organizations’ (1996), 84 California Law Review 1293. The argument derives from 
R.H. Coase’s seminal paper ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960), 3 Journal of Law and Economics 1-
44. For a critique of natural monopoly analysis, see A. Katz ‘The Potential Demise of Another Natural 
Monopoly: Rethinking the Collective Administration of Performing Rights’  (2005) 1(3) Journal of 
Competition Law and Economics 541, and ‘The Potential Demise of Another Natural Monopoly: New 
Technologies and the Administration of Performing Rights’ (2006) 2(2) Journal of Competition Law 
and Economics 245. 
12 To give some examples: PRS performing right income is roughly equally split between income from 
broadcasting and from general performance (i.e. music at pubs, clubs, shops, aircrafts, concerts). 
Unsurprisingly, the costs of collecting are much higher for the latter. For 1999, the PRS reported 
income of £75.54m from general licensing (of which 24.5% disappeared as administrative 
commission) and £79.58m from broadcasting (with 14.6% deducted for administrative expenses), 
leaving a net distribution of £57m and £68m respectively (PRS Yearbook 2000/01). The Design and 
Artists Copyright Society (DACS) administers reproduction rights for visual artists (painters, 
printmakers, sculptors, and photographers). Of the turnover of £3m in 2003, 25% are charged as 
administration costs (Annual Report 2004). Analytical tools for analysing the efficiency of collecting 
societies are discussed in F. Rochelandet ‘Are Copyright Collecting Societies Efficient?’ paper 
presented at the annual congress of the Society for Economic Research on Copyright Issues, Madrid 
2002 [available at www.serci.org]. See also A. Charnes, W.W. Cooper, and E. Rhodes ‘Measuring the 
efficiency of decision making units’ (1978) 2 European Journal of Operational Research 429-444.  
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In the case of music performing right and mechanical reproduction societies, the most 
intriguing feature of collective administration is the representation of both authors 
(composers and lyricists) and publishers – enforced by a governance structure under 
which changes to membership and distribution rules can only be implemented by 
mutual consent of both groups. Despite market pressures to the contrary, author 
members of German society GEMA receive 70% (compared to 30% of the publisher) 
of any performing right royalty distribution, and 60% of the mechanical rights. PRS 
distributes 50:50 between publishers and creators, while MCPS leaves the distribution 
shares to individual contracts between the parties.13 In addition, large right holders 
whose works are easier to monitor and account for, in effect subsidise small 
members. These distribution decisions are treated as internal matters, and will not be 
publicised. 
 
Many European collecting societies also weigh their distribution per copyright work 
according to a value judgment, including the amount of skill involved, and the 
cultural contribution of a genre or composer.14 Finally, under the guidelines of 
CISAC (Confédération Internationale des Sociétés d’Auteurs et Compositeurs), the 
international umbrella organisation of the author rights societies, up to 10% of 
collected licence fees may be channelled into socio-cultural funds.15 
                                                
13 Naturally, it is hard to know what would be a market rate in the absence of a market, a point put to 
me by Prof. Stan Liebowitz at the Montréal conference (and argued elsewhere, e.g. ‘Alternative 
Copyright Systems: The problems with a compulsory license’, a 2003 manuscript available on his 
website (http://www.utdallas.edu/~liebowit/). Two observations indicate to me that the royalty fees 
available to music writers are above what would be negotiated in a competitive market between willing 
individual sellers and buyers: (i) they are very high compared to other markets, such as performers, or 
video game developers; (ii) authors are under pressure from publishers to accept (and have accepted) a 
lower percentage of the royalty distribution in countries without a tradition of collective author 
organisation (such as the 10 new EU members which acceded in 2004). 
14 At GEMA, so-called ‘evaluation committees’ weighs the distribution of royalties to authors from 
considerations of length of membership, past income, artistic personality and overall contribution of an 
œuvre. In the UK, the classical music subsidy in the royalty distribution formula was phased out 
following the MMC report of 1996 (Monopolies and Mergers Commission Performing Rights, 
London: HMSO Cm 3147). In 1999, a PRS foundation was established for the support of new music, 
regardless of genre. 
15 The German law regulating copyright societies (Urheberwahrnehmungsgesetz) explicitly demands 
that they should foster ‘culturally important works and contributions’ (§7) and set up pension and 
social funds (§8). Anglo-American right holders are enraged by these deductions. They feel that their 
exported property subsidises foreign social and cultural policy: A. Harcourt, A. (1996), ‘The Unlawful 
Deduction Levied upon UK Composers’ Performing Rights Income’ (1996) 64 Copyright World 15. I 
address this argument below. 
 9 
 
The analysis suggests that collective administration can also be viewed as a form of 
unionisation. Authors no longer enter the market as individuals.16 This enables them 
to extract better terms than contracting individually with music publishers and music 
users (such as labels and broadcasters), and provide socio-cultural support to creators.  
 
In summary, the features of European Collecting Societies are: 
 
Characteristics under transaction cost rationale 
- two fold monopolists (towards users and members) 
- administration cannot be refused 
- licence cannot be refused 
 
Characteristics under solidarity rationale 
- publishers’ control below market expectations 
- socio-cultural deductions for the benefits of domestic creators 
- cross-subsidy between big and small right holders 
- discrimination between genres 
 
 
Commission and ECJ Jurisprudence17 
 
General: The exclusive territorial nature of intellectual property rights 
The exercise of exclusive intellectual property rights in itself should not give rise to 
competition concerns, since it is the purpose of intellectual property laws to provide 
for dynamic efficiencies through periods of exclusive territorial protection. The early 
jurisprudence of the ECJ18 developed a distinction between the existence of 
intellectual property rights (which was seen as outside the EC Treaty) and their 
exercise (which can be reviewed under Community law). As AG Fennelly correctly 
                                                
16 A. Peacock and R. Weir The Composer in the Market Place (London: Faber, 1975) at 41. 
17 Throughout this review of EC jurisprudence, the re-numbering of Articles 85 and 86 EC as Articles 
81 and 82 is adopted (Treaty of Amsterdam). In citations prior to 1 May 1999, the old article numbers 
are replaced with the new [indicated by brackets]. 
 10 
argues in Merck II19, this doctrine is fallacious. Intellectual property rights are 
provided in order to be exercised. Otherwise there would be no point to their grant, 
since the incentives to create and innovate would disappear. In the more recent line of 
jurisprudence emanating from Coditel II20, the Court recognised that absolute 
territorial protection under exclusive copyright licence agreements does not in itself 
infringe Article 81(1) EC. In Magill21 the Court stressed that the exercise of 
intellectual property rights would be examined under Article 82 EC only under 
exceptional circumstances: in this case findings of a dominant position plus failing to 
meet demand for a new product in a secondary market for which there is no 
substitute. 
 
Thus, the collective administration of copyright would have to be shown to be beyond 
the normal exercise of intellectual property rights. Before considering the case law in 
detail, two arguments need to be considered placing collecting societies beyond 
acquis communitaire examination under the prohibition on quantitative restrictions 
(Articles 28-30 EC), and under the competition rules applying to undertakings 
(Articles 81-82 EC). 
 
Do the rights administered by collecting societies fall under the obligations 
regarding the free movement of goods (Articles 28-30, EC Treaty)? 
During the 1970s, a case was made that author rights do not constitute ‘industrial or 
commercial property’ within the meaning of Article 30, and therefore Treaty 
obligations regarding the free movement of goods would not apply. For example, the 
nature of copyright under international treaties includes non-economic author rights 
that cannot be transferred as property: chiefly the right to paternity (the right to be 
named as the author) and the right to integrity (the right to object to modifications of 
a work that would prejudice the author’s reputation).22  The ECJ has consistently 
refused to distinguish literary and artistic property in this way, asserting that ‘the 
                                                                                                                                      
18 Cases 56 and 58/64: Consten & Grundig v. Commission [1966] ECR 229, [1966] CMLR 418; Case 
78/70, Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft v. Metro-SB-Großmärkte GmbH [1971] ECR 487, [1971] 
CMLR 631. 
19 Cases C-267 and 268/95: Merck v. Primecrown [1996] ECR I-6285, [1997] 1 CMLR 83. 
20 Case 262/81, Coditel v. SA Ciné Vog Films [1982] ECR 3381, [1983] 1 CMLR 49. 
21 Cases C-241&2/91, RTE & ITP v. Commission [1995] ECR 1-743; [1995] 4 CMLR 586. 
22 So-called droit moral: Berne Convention, Art. 6bis. 
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exclusive rights conferred by literary and artistic property are by their nature such as 
to affect trade in goods and services and also competitive relationships within the 
Community.’23 
 
Do collecting societies fall under the rules of competition (Articles 81-82, EC 
Treaty)? 
When the behaviour of collecting societies was first challenged under Articles 81 and 
82, they attempted to invoke Article 86(2) as being entrusted by the state ‘with the 
operation of services of general economic interest’, a provision that permits in certain 
circumstances derogation from the rules of competition. In BRT v. SABAM24 (1974), 
the first collecting society case before the European Courts, the ECJ characterised the 
Belgian performing right society as ‘an undertaking to which the state has not 
assigned any task and which manages private interest, including intellectual property 
rights protected by law’. This was confirmed in 1979 and 1983 in the Greenwich25 
and GVL26 cases.  
 
 
Agreements and concerted practices (Art. 81 EC issues) 
In one reading, collecting societies are joint ventures creating a super-dominant 
market position in at least two respects: towards users and right holders. Thus it is 
surprising that their very existence has not been challenged under Article 81.27 
                                                
23 Case C-92/92, Phil Collins v. IMTRAT Handels GmbH, [1993] 3 CMLR 773 (para. 22). Cf. W. 
Cornish and D. Llewelyn Intellectual Property (5th ed.) (London: Sweet & Maxwell 2003), section 18-
2. 
24 Case 127/73, Belgische Radio en Televisie v. SV SABAM and NV Fonior, [1974] ECR 313, [1974] 2 
CMLR 238. 
25 Case 22/79, Greenwich Film Production, Paris v. SACEM, [1979] ECR 3275, [1980] 1 CMLR 629. 
26 Case 7/82, Gesellschaft zur Verwertung von Leistungsschutzrechten mbH (GVL) v. Commission, 
[1983] ECR 483; [1983] 3 CMLR 645. 
27 This point was made by J. Temple Lang, then a director in DG Competition (‘Media, Multimedia 
and European Community Antitrust Law’ (1998) 21 Fordham International Law Journal 1296): ‘The 
assumption that no member or group of members of a society could negotiate licences is no longer 
true, if it ever was, of big sound reproduction companies which can do and do, enter into individual 
negotiations, in particular for reproduction rights, when the size and importance of the licensee makes 
it worthwhile to do so. It seems to follow that as far as such companies are concerned the main reason 
for ignoring Article [81(1)] is no longer convincing, and such companies need exemption under Article 
[81(3)] for their participation in these societies, at least in their relations with licensees which are 
important enough to make individual negotiations appropriate. It is surprising that this issue has not 
been raised before now.’  
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Three lines of reasoning could be constructed. 
(i) The agreements constituting collecting societies form part of a process of 
collective bargaining. The leading cases here are Albany International and 
Brentjens28 in which the ECJ ruled that agreements on compulsory 
pension schemes fall outside the scope of Article 81. To my knowledge, 
this argument has not been tried on collective administration agreements. 
 
(ii) In the 1989 Tournier and Lucazeau cases29, French Discothèques 
challenged SACEM’s reciprocal representation agreements with other 
collecting societies (ensuring domestic exclusivity) that prevented direct 
access to the Anglo-American repertoire the appellants were interested in.  
The ECJ held that the reciprocal agreements between societies may not 
fall under Art. 81(1) provided no concerted action was evidenced, and 
there was another reason for these agreements. ‘Such a reason might be 
that the copyright-management societies in other Member States would be 
obliged, in the event of direct access to their repertoires, to organize their 
own management and monitoring system in another country.’  (Lucazeau 
at para 18; Tournier at para 24) 
 
(iii) A third line of reasoning would concede that both, agreements constituting 
collecting societies, and reciprocal representation contracts fall within Art. 
81(1) and seek exemption under Art. 81(3). This would be consistent with 
the view taken by the Commission in other instances of collective 
licensing agreements, such as sport broadcasting and joint film 
distribution. In a statement of objections to the English Premiere League 
                                                
28 Case C-67/96, Albany International BV v. Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie [1999] 
ECR I-5751, [2000] 4 CMLR 446; Cases C-115 to 117/97, Brentjens v. SBVHB, [1999] ECRI-6025, 
[2000] 4 CMLR 566. AG Jacobs opinion in Albany laid down four conditions for disapplying Art. 81. 
The collective bargaining agreement (i) was made as part of normal collective bargaining, (ii) was 
made in good faith, rather than to conceal anti-competitive restrictions, (iii) dealt with core aspects of 
collective bargaining, such as wages or other conditions of work, and (iv) did not affect third parties. 
For discussion, see D.G. Goyder EC Competition Law (4th ed.), (Oxford: OUP, 2003) pp. 104-5. 
29 Cases 110/88, 241/88, 242/88, Lucazeau and others v. SACEM; Case 395/87, Ministère Public v. 
Tournier. All at [1989] ECR 2811, [1991] 4 CMLR 248. At paragraph 11, the reciprocal representation 
contract is specified: ‘each society is to apply, with respect to works in the other society’s repertoire, 
the same scales, methods and means of collection and distribution of royalties as those which it applies 
for works in its own repertoire.’ 
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broadcasting rights arrangements30, the Commission argues that the 
characteristics of sport, such as the need for solidarity, can be taken into 
account under Art. 81(3). However, restrictive provisions that foreclose 
the market would not be indispensable to the benefits of the agreement 
(guaranteeing solidarity between clubs). Similarly, in the UIP decision 
([1989] OJ L226/356), a joint film distribution agreement was exempted 
under Art. 81(3) as it produced economic benefits for the production and 
distribution of motion pictures and for consumers. 
 
It turns out that there are a number of agreements between collecting societies and 
users that have been treated in this way under the old notification procedure.31 They 
all respond to Internet demands for a single pan-European licence while attempting in 
some ways to safeguard a role for national collecting societies. The models proposed 
fall into three broad categories. 
a. Agreements were licence conditions are harmonised (each society can 
issue a single pan-European licence but under fixed terms).32 
b. Agreements where each participating society can issue a single pan-
European licence but the tariff applied is that of the country of 
destination (Simulcasting agreement).33 
c. Agreements where each participating society can issue a single pan-
European licence but the licence will be granted by the society of the 
                                                
30 A provisional settlement was announced in IP/03/1748. For discussion, see Aitman and Jones 2004, 
p. 146, n. 66. 
31 Regulation 17/62 [1959-62] OJ Spec. Ed. 87. Since 1 May 2004, this has been replaced by 
Regulation 1/2003 [2004] OJ L1/1 which decentralises enforcement of Articles 81 and 82.  
32 There is currently no operational example of this type of agreement. COM(2004) 261 (The 
Management of Copyright and Related Rights in the Internal Market, at para 1.2.4) refers to the 
OnLineArt Agreement initiative for a Community-wide licence for on-line uses of works of art and 
photography. 
33 Case COMP/C2/38.014, IFPI Simulcasting, [2003] OJ L107/58: Agreement between national record 
producers’ collecting societies, licensing sound recordings for pan-European simultaneous Internet 
transmissions of broadcasts (notified by IFPI: International Federation of the Phonic Industry). The 
Commission decided that Art. 81(3) was met, as the agreement created a new product that would 
improve the distribution of music to the benefit of consumers. The clause applying the tariff of the 
country of destination was ruled to be restrictive, going beyond what is necessary for the existence of 
the agreement. However, societies would not participate without that clause. The agreement also would 
create competition between societies. Transparent separation of administrative costs was agreed: ‘This 
way, commercial users will be able to recognise the most efficient societies in the EEA and seek their 
licences from the collecting societies that provide them at lower cost.’ (COM 261 3.4(iii)) 
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country where the content provider is operating (Santiago 
agreement).34 
 
The Commission advocates the Simulcasting model of competition between 
collecting societies. This will be further discussed below. 
 
 
Abuse of a dominant position (Art. 82 issues) 
There is widespread consensus that collecting societies occupy a dominant position in 
their national markets. In many cases, single national markets have been ruled to be a 
‘substantial part’ of the common market within the meaning of Article 82.35 
 
The Article 82 case law on collecting societies falls into two groups: abusive conduct 




- Collecting societies cannot discriminate on grounds of nationality.36  
                                                
34 The Santiago agreement is an agreement between the major music performing right author societies 
to license community-wide transmission by electronic means, including web-casting and on-demand 
services. It was notified to the Commission under Regulation 17 in April 2001.  The Commission 
opened proceedings in May 2004, transforming the process into an ‘own initiative procedure’ under 
Regulation 1/2003.  The Commission believes that users should not be forced to choose a licence from 
the collecting society controlling their territory, if an alternative licence was viable (Speech by Herbert 
Unger, Head of Media Division, DG Comp at European Cable Communication Association (ECCA), 
Brussels, 23 June 2004). 
35 Collecting societies have been characterised as dominant by numerous national competition 
authorities: cf. German Bundeskartellamt, Verfügung vom 18.11.1960: GEMA as 
‘marktbeherrschendes Unternehmen’; Hübner and Stern [1978] 1997, p. 225; British Office of Fair 
Trading (OFT) (referral of the PRS to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission, 30 November 1994. 
In GVL v. Commission (Case 7/82, [1983] ECR 483, [1983] CMLR 645), German music performers’ 
and record producers’ society GVL made an unsuccessful attempt to argue that the market for rights 
exploitation services should be defined to include promoters and record companies. The EJC ruled that 
for the management of secondary rights vested in performing artists and record manufacturers, GVL 
had a de facto monopoly. Dominance in a single member state was deemed to be a substantial part of 
the common market in BRT v. SABAM (Case 127/73, Belgische Radio en Televisie v. SV SABAM and 
NV Fonior, [1974] ECR 313, [1974] 2 CMLR 238). 
36 Membership and collection cannot be restricted to domestic citizens or residents (GEMA I, OJ 
L134/15, decision of 20 June 1971; Phil Collins v. IMTRAT Handels GmbH). Foreign members 
(authors and publishers) cannot be excluded from participating in the governance of a society, nor from 
socio-cultural benefits (GVL). 
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- There can be no preferential treatment for groups of members, but threshold 
conditions to full membership, and distribution variations according to genre 
and cultural value have been tolerated.37 
- There must be maximum freedom for members to decide which repertoire to 
inject into collective administration. However, collecting societies can insist 
on transfer of whole groups of rights, and rights in future works if that is 
indispensable to the operation of the society.38 
- Right holders must be able to withdraw from membership, and assign their 
repertoire elsewhere. Collecting societies can insist on lengthy notice 
periods.39 
- Collecting societies can limit the influence of members who are economically 
dependent on users (i.e. if a publisher is part of the same parent company as a 
record label). However the least restrictive measure has to be adopted.40 
- There is no specific ECJ case law on the freedom (or otherwise) of collecting 
societies to refuse the administration of individual rights and right-holders.41 




- As a dominant undertaking, a collecting society cannot refuse to license a user 
in its own territory without a legitimate reason.42 
                                                
37 GEMA II (decision of 6 July 1972, OJ L166/22). However, there is a recent policy trend requiring 
that royalty distribution must match actual use as closely as possible (MMC report on PRS, 1996; 
COM 261). There is no case law to that effect. 
38 A required blanket assignment of all present and future rights was ruled to be abusive in BRT v. 
SABAM. In GEMA I, the Commission identified seven categories of rights members may assign 
separately: (1) public performance, (2) broadcasting, (3) film performance, (4) mechanical 
reproduction, (5) film synchronisation, (6) video reproduction and performance, (7) new categories of 
right. The MMC report on the PRS (1996) added for the UK the rights to live performances. A 
mandatory requirement to assign on-line exploitation was held to be an unfair trading condition under 
Art. 82(a)  (Daftpunk decision, Case C2/37.219, Banghalter et Homem Christo v. SACEM, 6 August 
2002). Authors also must be able to assign different groups of rights to different societies in different 
countries (Case 22/79, Greenwich Film Production, Paris v. SACEM, [1979] ECR 3275, [1980] 1 
CMLR 629). However, collecting societies can resist cherry-picking (for example, only having those 
rights assigned that are expensive to administrate). 
39 In GEMA II, the commission allowed a minimum membership term of three years. Retaining right 
for five years after a member’s withdrew is likely to be unfair (BRT v. SABAM). 
40 For example, conditions on the exercise of votes are acceptable, exclusions from membership are 
not (GEMA I). Restrictions can be imposed that strengthen a society’s negotiation power toward users 
(SABAM, para. 9). In GEMA III (OJ L94 /12, decision of 4 December 1981), the Commission 
authorised the societies statutes imposing uniform effective rates of renumeration (thus preventing 
members from making payments to users). 
41 The general Article 82 case law on refusal to supply applies (e.g. Cases 6 and 7/73, ICI and 
Commercial Solvents v. Commission, [1974] ECR 223, [1974] 1CMLR 309; Magill: Cases C-
241&2/91, RTE & ITP v. Commission [1995] ECR 1-743; [1995] 4 CMLR 586). Some national laws 
provide for a duty to administer rights for all nationals or residents of EU and EEA states (e.g. the 
German law regulating copyright societies  – §6 WahrnG, so-called Wahrnehmungszwang). 
42 There are no specific rulings on refusal to license with respect to collecting societies. Again, the 
general Article 82 case law on refusal to supply applies (supra note___ Solvents v. Commission). 
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- Refusal to license only part of the repertoire is acceptable if necessary for 
functioning of a society.43  
- Excessive pricing of licences is abusive but hard to prove.44  
- Price discrimination between large and small users has been raised as an 
abusive trading condition, but the Court did not rule on the point.45 
- There is no ECJ case law on the nature, or lack of an appeals procedure 
making tariffs contestable.46 
- There is no ECJ case law requiring introduction of competition between 
societies.47 
 
It appears that the European Courts accept trading conditions with respect to 
collecting societies that would be considered abusive in many other contexts.48 The 
main line of reasoning is a familiar principle of proportionality: restrictive conditions 
are justified if they are required for the society to carry out its activities on the 
necessary scale. Yet, there is no explication about the function of collective 
administration beyond managing private interests. What are the activities that are 
necessary? The ECJ has tolerated, not always consistently, a number of practices 
relating to collective bargaining, licensing conditions and redistribution of royalties 
that can only be justified on social and cultural policy grounds. 
 
                                                
43  In the French Discothèques cases (Lucazeau, Tournier), the impracticability of setting up a 
monitoring system in the foreign territory was deemed an acceptable reason. 
44 If tariffs in other member states are appreciably different, the collecting society needs ‘to justify 
such a difference by reference to objective and relevant dissimilarities between copyright management’ 
(Lucazeau, para 33). Including a mechanical fee for public performances in a discotheque is acceptable 
in the context of differences in national licensing systems  (Case 402/85, Basset v. SACEM, [1987] 
ECR 1747, [1987] 3 CMLR 173). 
45 In the French Discothèques cases (Lucazeau, Tournier), the appellants complained that large scale 
users, such as radio and TV broadcasters, obtained lower tariffs. Stamatoudi argues that the line of 
cases on price discrimination looks at clients in competition to each other, not treating customers in 
different situations in the same way. I.A. Stamatoudi, ‘The European Court’s Love-Hate Relationship 
with Collecting Societies’ (1997), 19(6) European Intellectual Property Review 289-297. 
46 According to AG Jacobs in Tournier, the fact that there is no regulatory control of the price charged 
by a society is relevant. For discussion, see Temple Lang 1998, p. 57. Germany and the UK are the 
only EU countries with a formalised appeals procedure. For analyses of the jurisprudence of the UK 
Copyright Tribunal, see W. Cornish and D. Llewelyn Intellectual Property (5th ed.) (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell 2003), sections 12-54 to 12-58; L. Bently and B. Sherman Intellectual Property Law (2nd ed.) 
(Oxford: OUP, 2004), pp. 286-7. 
47 The French Discothèques cases (Lucazeau, Tournier) hint at problems with SACEM’s 
administrative overheads due to lack of competition, but left the issue to national regulation. 
48 At the Cambridge workshop, Professor Rosa Greaves (Glasgow University) suggested that ECJ case 
law on the collecting societies may have evolved in response to similar issues as the jurisprudence on 
shipping liner conferences (e.g. Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports SA v. Commission (Cases C-
395/96P, C-396/96P) [2000] ECR II-1365; [2000] CMLR 1076. A comparison would appear fruitful.  
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Regulatory Intervention  
I have argued that collecting societies provide a function beyond private joint 
ventures between right owners aimed at minimising their own transaction costs, a 
position recognised in some but not all of EC competition jurisprudence. Where such 
a function is cited in case law, there is insufficient development of the concepts 
supporting this function. In this section, I shall develop a more coherent doctrine of 
collective administration of copyright from an analysis of policy interventions by the 
European Commission. 
 
Community-wide licensing and good governance 
The Commission has justified recent policy moves on the collective management of 
copyright as a response to the rapid emergence of a digitised environment since the 
mid-1990s. According to Charlie McCreevy (the Internal Market and Services 
Commissioner of the Barroso Commission), ‘Europe’s model of copyright clearance 
belongs more to the nineteenth century than to the 21st. Once upon a time it may have 
made sense for the member state to be the basic unit of division. The internet 
overturns that premise. In the nineteenth century, music was primarily performed in 
cafés, bars or music halls that needed to be monitored locally by local societies. But 
this is no longer the only or even the most important way the Europeans consume 
music.’49 
 
Technological factors which affect the rationale of the European structure of 
collective administration include: 
(i) the increased possibilities of individual licensing, using digital rights 
management technologies (DRM);50 
(ii) the borderless nature of Internet-based services (such as web-casting, 
streaming and downloads), creating a demand for Community-wide licensing.51 
                                                
49 Speech/05/588 ‘Commission recommendation on management of online rights in musical works’ at 
the UK Presidency Conference on Copyright and the Creative Economy (7 October 2005). 
50 ‘DRM systems can be used to clear rights, secure payments, to trace behaviour and to enforce 
rights’ (COM 261, para 1.2.5). Examples include Windows Media Player and the ‘Fairplay’ system 
incorporated in Apple’s iTunes service. The technology (using an encryption/decryption algorithm and 
meta data audit trails) allows the content provider to prescribe detailed conditions of usage. According 
to Article 5(2)(b) of the Information Society Directive (2001/29), copyright levies for unauthorised 
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Under various Internal Market and Competition Commissioners, as well as Heads of 
the Copyright unit, the Commission has made numerous attempts to regulate 
Collecting Societies since the 1995 Green Paper on Copyright an Related Rights in 
the Information Society (COM(95) 382). Over the next decade, stops, starts, and turn-
abouts have been too numerous to record here in detail. However, during 2004 a new 
policy to liberalise the market for rights administration services began to emerge, first 
as an option in Communication (COM(2004) 261) The Management of Copyright and 
Related Rights in the Internal Market, then as choice with the publication of the Study 
on a Community Initiative on the Cross-Border Collective Management of Copyright 
(7 July 2005), and finally as a Commission Recommendation On the Collective 
Cross-border Management of Copyright and Related Rights for Legitimate Online 
Music Services (adopted 12 October 2005), a new ‘soft law’ instrument addressed ‘to 
the Member States and to all economic operators which are involved in the 
management of copyright and related rights’. Following an unspecified period of 
close monitoring (thought to be about four years), a more binding legislative 
approach might be considered.52 
 
The introduction of market choices in the form of competition between collecting 
societies has been summarised as a simple two-fold prescription: 
- Right owners must have a choice in selecting their protector. They should 
have the choice of the collecting society they select to license their rights.  
                                                                                                                                      
private use (compensating right holders in many European countries via collecting societies) must take 
account ‘of the application or non-application of technological measures’. 
51 The Commission Study on a Community Initiative on the Cross-Border Collective Management of 
Copyright (7 July 2005) contrasts revenues for 2004 from online music services in Western Europe of 
€27.22 million (of which €23.4m are attributable to downloads and €3.8m to subscription-based 
services) with US online music revenues of €207 million (of which €155.9m are attributable to 
downloads and €51.1m to subscription-based services), blaming a ‘lack of innovative and dynamic 
structures for the cross-border collective management of legitimate online music services’ (p. 6) as ‘a 
commercial users requires a licence from each and every relevant collective rights manager in each 
territory of the EU in which the work is accessible’ (p. 8). 
52 COM 261 was published on 16 April 2004, and the consultation process closed in June 2004. A 
draft directive was scheduled for early 2005, and repeatedly postponed. On 7 July 2005, a study was 
published on how copyright for musical works is licensed for Internet use, and a press release 
announced Community action requiring cross-border management of copyright. The new ‘soft law’ 
approach in form of a Commission Recommendation was announced by McCreevy at the UK 
Presidency Conference on Copyright and the Creative Economy on 7 October 2005. 
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- Users should have the choice of the one stop shopping platform when 
acquiring the licences for the rights for regional and global operation.53 
 
However, at closer inspection the prescription is anything but simple. The first 
implementation decision relates to the nature of competition to be introduced. Will it 
be price competition (i.e. are users able to negotiate tariffs individually with the 
societies of their choice), or will there be a collectively set Europe-wide tariff (such 
as for the mechanical reproduction right which record producers are already able to 
clear with one collecting society of their choice).54 In the first scenario, users will 
seek a licence from the society with whom they can negotiate the cheapest tariff; in 
the second scenario, users individually cannot change the tariff structure, and 
competition takes place between societies only for services to right holders.55 
 
The second implementation decision relates to the distribution rules operated by 
various societies. A prominent example are the different royalty shares allocated to 
authors and publishers in music performing right and mechanical societies, varying 
between 70:30, 60:40, 50:50 or individually negotiated rates. Thus all authors should 
wish to join societies with generous distribution rules, while publishers would opt for 
low or individually negotiated rates reflecting their superior commercial bargaining 
power. Will publishers be able to force author friendly societies to change their 
distribution rules?56 
 
The most important provisions of the Commission Recommendation (Provisions 3-9) 
focus on introducing community wide licensing by giving right-holders the freedom 
to override reciprocal contracts between societies. Blanket assignments of ‘all 
utilisation forms’ (including various on-line exploitations) are deemed no longer 
                                                
53 Ungerer, Herbert (2004), ‘Competition law and rights management’, speech at Regulatory Forum, 
European Cable Comunication Association (ECCA), Brussels, 23 June 2004 [available at 
europa.eu.int/comm/competition/ speeches/index_theme_26.html]. 
54 For discussion, see R. Wallis, C. Baden-Fuller, M. Kretschmer, G.M. Klimis ‘Contested Collective 
Administration of Intellectual Property Rights in Music (1999), 14(1) European Journal of 
Communication 5-35. 
55 This point was made to me by Professor Abraham Hollander, Dept. of Economics, Université de 
Montréal.  
56 The Commission Study on a Community Initiative on the Cross-Border Collective Management of 
Copyright (7 July 2005) suggests that publishers should be able to exercise influence in any society 
they join according to the commercial value of the rights they administer. 
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necessary.57 This follows the approach in the IFPI [Simulcasting] Decision that ‘in 
new technology fields, territorial restrictions in the management of those rights are 
generally not acceptable, and must be reviewed’.58 Price competition, and distribution 
rule competition are not discussed, either because the implications have not been 
seen, or perhaps because it is politically convenient to fudge the issue.  
 
Other provisions relate to equitable59 distribution of royalties (Provisions 10-12), non-
discrimination of representation (Provision 13), accountability (Provision 14) and 
dispute resolution (Provision 15). These rules are aimed at improving governance 
(10-15) but similarly evade detail. Accountability and dispute settlement is primarily 
defined in relation to right-holders, not users – while COM 261 had stated explicitly 
(at 3.5.2) that under an appeals procedure ‘[i]t is essential for users to be in a position 
to contest the tariffs, be it through access to the courts, specially created mediation 
tribunals or with the assistance of public authorities which supervise the activities of 
collecting societies’. 
  
The Commission Recommendation appears in line with a transaction cost rationale of 
collective administration. Authors, publishers, record labels or performers are 
conceptualised as one category, right-holders, and users are treated purely 
economically, regardless of whether they are engaged in a desirable cultural activity 
(say, small live venues), or act as a major multinational player (e.g. commercial radio 
station, record label, music TV). However, the main transaction cost user benefit, i.e. 
to be able to get all rights from one source, is thrown out. 
 
Commissioner McCreevy anticipates that competition between collecting societies 
will lead to the evolution of ‘attractive packages – repertoire’, gathered by many 
different rights management services.60 The decision to use competition law 
                                                
57 In COM 261, the Communication had proposed (at para 3.4) to revisit the GEMA I categories of 
rights, owners may withhold. 
58 Supra note_ . H. Ungerer, ‘Competition Law and Rights Management’, speech at Regulatory Forum, 
European Cable Comunication Association (ECCA), Brussels, 23 June 2004 [available at 
europa.eu.int/comm/competition/ speeches/index_theme_26.html]. 
59 ‘Equitable’ here means only ‘transparent’. In a newsletter article, the Head of the Copyright unit, 
emphasised the need for transparent distribution of royalties to other countries within the EU (T. 
Lüder, ‘Copyright at the Crossroads?’ DG Internal Market Newsletter, May 2005). 
60 Speech 05/588, supra note__ 
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principles in order to revamp collective administration may succeed in pressing 
collecting societies into speedier and more accurate business processes, lowering 
overheads – thus increasing productive efficiency. However, offering a choice to 
licensors and licensees (who continuously assess the transaction costs of multiple 
contracting) may support not a universal service system (to which all right holders 
have access on equitable terms), but a system where the major right holders and users 
selectively decide, supported by sophisticated information technology, whether 
administering collectively is worthwhile – and if so, which collecting society to use.61 
Niche repertoire may be abandoned, as it is more expensive to monitor, collect and 
distribute than broadcasters’ play lists. Distribution shares in favour of authors will 
come under market pressure from publishers. 
 
Depending on these details, competition between collecting societies may have the 
following consequences (which could be analysed as a move away from a ‘solidarity’ 
rationale of collective administration): 
• major users will be able to reduce their licensing tariffs as they negotiate with 
competing collecting societies 
• major right holders will inject rights into the society that distributes most to 
them (or will not inject at all) 
• publishers’ influence within collecting societies will increase 
• collecting societies will have few incentives to offer low start-up tariffs to 
small, innovative users 
• cross-subsidies in the distribution of licence fees between big and small right 
holders will be phased out 
• socio-cultural deductions for the benefits of domestic creators will come under 
pressure 
• discrimination between genres will disappear 
 
                                                
61 I have discussed this in more detail in my 2002 paper ‘The Failure of Property Rules in Collective 
Administration’, 24(3) European Intellectual Property Review 126-136, at 133. Compare also [Wallis, 
Baden-Fuller, Kretschmer, Klimis 1999 supra note]. The idea has been around for some time (Besen 
and Kirby 1989 [supra note__] attribute it to Paul Goldstein (at note 8). It is also the solution 
advocated by Katz [supra note__]. 
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Increasing the transparency of collective administration, and requiring cross-border 
administration and licences (using competition law tools) paradoxically may increase 




Alternative policy principles 
The policy interventions advanced by the European Commission are not explicit 
about whether competition in the market for rights exploitation services is an aim in 
itself, or a means to shake up the bureaucracy of collecting societies while preserving 
non-economic goals. Within the framework of Community competencies, non-
economic aims are hard to articulate. Thus the Commission’s preference for the 
language of competition is understandable.62 Still, better policy making has to start 
with a clear statement of regulatory aims. 
 
COM 261 begun with a salutation of non-economic aims: ‘Besides the more general 
economic aims of stimulating investment, growth and job creation, copyright 
protection serves non-economic objectives, in particular creativity, cultural diversity, 
cultural identity’ (para 1.1.1). However, as discussed in the previous section, the 
measures proposed are couched in the competition law language of ‘non-
discrimination’, ‘efficiency’, ‘rationalisation’ and ‘transparency’ (see particularly 
Recitals 9, 10, 12 and 13). 
 
In this final section I argue that the collective administration of copyright and 
competition law are two distinct, but partially overlapping mechanisms that ought to 
foster two aims. 
 
1. Access 
Copyright law awards broad exclusive rights for long periods of time (in Europe, 
the term is 70 years post mortem auctoris; 50 years for the related rights of 
producers and performers). This may hinder the introduction of new services, and 
                                                
62 In recent years, European competition policy has recognised other policy goals only to the extent 
that they can be ‘subsumed’ under economic efficiency. For discussion, see G. Monti, ‘Article 81 EC 
and Public Policy’ (2002), 39 CMLRev 1057 
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lead to an under-utilization of copyright works.63 Collective licensing may 




Although the copyright term is derived from the author’s life, in commercial 
practice it is usually assigned to a market intermediary for exploitation. The terms 
of copyright contracts tend to favour best-selling authors. Diversity of cultural 
production will benefit from a reward system that is accessible to niche creators 
and allows for collective bargaining.64 
 
Despite the noise generated by the lobbying efforts of major right holders and users 
(often focussing on ‘piracy’), a consensus on these two regulatory aims is achievable. 
It can be backed up by first principles laid down in instruments such as the UNESCO 
Convention on Cultural Diversity65, and the social and cultural articles of the EC 
Treaty.   
 
 
How to articulate access aims? 
The aims of a regime of collective administration to provide access is to a 
considerable extent congruent with competition law aims, as the discussion on the 
‘refusal to supply’ jurisprudence in section two above indicated. However, the hurdle 
for examining the exploitation of copyright under the Magill test is high.66 Although 
exclusive right owner choice in exercising copyright and related rights may not be 
                                                
63 For a discussion of ‘under-utilization resulting from copyright protection in the presence of market 
power’, see T. Gallagher, ‘Copyright Compulsory Licensing and Incentives’, in Copyright in the 
Cultural Industries, ed. R. Towse (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2002), pp. 85-98. It could also be 
argued that copyright law facilitates concentration processes as incumbent firms reap the benefits of an 
extended backcatalogue of copyright protected contents. 
64 I have considered the empirical effects of music copyright contracts in M. Kretschmer, G.M. Klimis, 
R. Wallis, ‘The Changing Location of Intellectual Property Rights in Music: A study of music 
publishers, collecting societies and media conglomerates’ (1999) 17(2) Prometheus 163-186 and M. 
Kretschmer, ‘Artists’ Earnings and Copyright: A review of British and German music industry data in 
the context of digital technologies’ (2005) 10(1) First Monday (www.firstmonday.org) pp. 1-20. 
65 The UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions 
(adopted on 20 October 2005) came into force on 18 March 2007. In an unprecedented move, the EU 
ratified the Convention as a regional organization of economic integration. 
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conducive to the development of new digital markets, the rules of competition are a 
cumbersome means for solving this generic problem of copyright.67  
 
In considering regulating access through a regime of collective administration, 
attention must be paid to international copyright obligations. Under the 1994 WTO 
TRIPS Agreement and the 1996 WIPO Internet Treaties, exceptions or limitations to 
exclusive rights must be confined to ‘certain special cases which do not conflict with 
the normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate 
interests of the right holder’.68 One technique open to legislators is to use the concept 
of ‘extended licensing’ to achieve very similar effects to a ‘compulsory licence’. For 
the so-called Internet right (‘communication to the public, including making available 
on demand’, Art. 3 Info Soc Directive 2001/29) COM 261 considered and rejected 
two options  (i) compulsory licences, (ii) legislating that a licence issued in any 
member state on the Internet right covers all territories.69 
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
66 Finding of a dominant position plus failing to meet demand for a new product for which there is no 
substitute (and there is no objective justification for refusing to licence)  
67 An alternative would be fairly radical re-casting of competition concepts. At the Munich workshop, 
Professor Josef Drexl advocated a shift from ‘allocative efficiency’ focussing on price and output to 
the dynamic concept of ‘creative competition’ which, in the sphere of copyright, should ensure equal 
market access to all copyright works (cf. J. Drexl ‘Competition in the Field of Collective Management: 
Preferring ‘creative competition’ to ‘allocative efficiency’ in European copyright law’, in P. Torremans 
(ed.) Handbook on European Copyright Law (2007). Drexl’s approach arrives from different premises 
at very similar policy recommendations to my own.  
68 The so-called three-step-test is taken from Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention where it defines 
permitted exceptions to the reproduction right only. Note that under Berne, the three-step-test does 
only apply to the reproduction right. However, Art. 13 of the TRIPS Agreement (1994) and Art. 10 of 
the WIPO Copyright Treaty (1996) make the test applicable to all copyright limitations and exceptions. 
69 According to COM 261, such prescriptions would be at variance with the intellectual property 
principles on territoriality and possibly with international obligations (WIPO 1996 Treaties, 
establishing the Internet right as an exclusive right: ‘making available to the public… in such a manner 
that members of the public may access these works from a place and at a time individually chosen by 
them’; Art. 8, WIPO Copyright Treaty; Arts. 10 and 14, WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty). 
Many commentators think that under the Berne three-step-test, collective management can only be 
compulsory if right holders have no other viable way to exercise an exclusive right. Under a system of 
extended licensing (used for example in Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland), ‘as soon as a substantial 
number of right holders of a certain category agree to participate in a collective scheme, the scheme is 
automatically extended not only to other national right holders in the same category, but to all foreign 
ones as well’ (Gervais, supra note___, at 29). 
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How to articulate reward aims? 
Facilitating the reward of creators beyond their individual bargaining power in 
cultural markets relies on a non-economic justification that appears to be at variance 
with competition law’s emphasis on allocative efficiency. But note that EC 
competition jurisprudence has recognized the social benefits of collective bargaining, 
exempting some practices from examination under the rules of competition (for 
discussion of Albany and Brentjens, see section two above). 
 
In developing single market and competition policies, the Commission is also obliged 
to take account of cultural aspects (Art. 151 EC). Fostering cultural diversity through 
the encouragement of creators at the margins of commercial viability, creators in 
smaller domestic markets, and creators in niche cultures is a defensible Community 
aim that can influence the regulation of copyright management services. 
 
 
Which Community instruments should be used to regulate collecting societies? 
Any intervention can legitimately draw on single market concerns. As COM states (at 
para 1.2.3):  ‘A lack of common rules regarding the governance of collecting societies 
may potentially be detrimental to both users and right holders, as it may expose them 
through different conditions applying in various Member States, as well as to a lack 
of transparency and legal certainty. The more divergence exists on such rules, the 
more difficult it is in principle to license across borders and to establish licensing for 
the territory of several or all Member States.’ The justification of intervention can 
also point to competition concerns, identifying collecting societies as dominant 
undertakings (as the sole provider of a management infrastructure to right holders, 
and as the only supplier of licences to copyright users). In line with the proposals of 
COM 261, tariffs need to become transparent and contestable, as should be the 
distribution of fees collected. In effect, the collective administration of copyright can 
no longer be at the discretion of right owners. Consumers and users should be 
involved in the regulation of collective copyright management services. 
 
A major concern of the Commission appears to be the onerous nature of seeking 
Community-wide licences. Rather than regulating for pan-European licences directly, 
or giving right holders and users the choice between collecting societies competing 
for pan-European business, tighter regulatory control itself (including the review of 
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tariffs and distributions) could deliver acceptable pan-European licences that do not 
favour the major right holders and users only.70 
 
 
Criteria for the re-assessment of current licensing tariffs and distributions 
Having delivered a governance structure that can meaningfully review tariffs and 
distributions, the attention needs to turn to the criteria to be used in setting tariffs and 
distributions. This is a thorny area where the experience of countries with a central 
copyright board may be helpful. Often proxies are sought, seeking to simulate 
agreements between willing buyers and sellers. Measures of substitutability suggested 
for the assessment of tariffs include audience ratings, advertisers’ willingness to pay, 
broadcasters’ willingness to pay, viewers’ willingness to pay under pay-per-view.71  
 
It is submitted that tariffs and distributions should be reviewed not merely from 
proxies of willing individual sellers and buyers (the transaction cost rationale) but 
also under a framework of socio-cultural aims. For reasons outlined above, this may 
exceed Community competencies and therefore has a more natural home in the 
domestic social and cultural policies of Member States. However, this poses a 
problem for information services (such as digital downloads of music files) that 
increasingly take place in a single European market.72 Central licensing agreements 
between major right holders and users negotiated at pan-European level will have 
pan-European social and cultural consequences. Which regulator will supervise 
these?   
 
                                                
70 One proposal, still within the remit of competition law, would be to recast collective administration 
as an ‘essential facility’ (Temple Lang supra note___, p. 59): ‘A single Community society could 
achieve the same results more efficiently than the present over-complex structure, and might not be 
significantly less competitive.’ 
71 The Canadian experience is usefully summarised in Y.A. George Hynna ‘Evolution of Judicial 
Review of Decisions of The Copyright Board’. In SENA (Case C-245/00 [2003] ECR I-1251), the 
European Court of Justice developed the meaning of the Community concept of ‘equitable 
remuneration’ as an assessment ‘in the light of the value of that use in trade’ (para 37). The method 
chosen by the Member States must be ‘such as to enable a proper balance to be achieved between the 
interests of performing artists and producers in obtaining remuneration for the broadcast of a particular 
phonogram, and the interests of third parties in being able to broadcast the phonogram on terms that 
are reasonable’ (para 36).  
72 For example, under a deal announced in January 2007, EMI Music Publishing, PRS and GEMA will 
form a new company CELAS which will be the only source of licences for EMI repertoire for online 
and mobile usage within 41 European territories (www.celas.eu).  
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The tension between Community and national perspectives is most acute with respect 
to three issues. Here, competition law can offer few solutions: 
 
- Collecting societies extract too heavily from fragmented users (such as clubs, 
concert venues and smaller websites) where the societies’ bargaining power is 
high and collection is expensive. This is inefficient, as well as introducing an 
undesirable bias against diverse and local cultures. Live performances in small 
venues and schools should be encouraged: ‘contemporary’ material should not 
be significantly more expensive than ‘classical’ works. Taking account of 
these cultural imperatives, collection should concentrate on the major 
commercial users (where the societies’ bargaining power and fees are under 
pressure in a system that may facilitate user choice). 
 
- Licences permitting free use must be possible. The blanket assignment of 
rights to collecting societies has become a problem for initiatives that wish to 
offer authors more options in authorising transformative and non-commercial 
use of copyright works.73 Administratively this creates a similar challenge for 
collecting societies as the partial withdrawal of repertoire by major right 
holders (the ‘cherry-picking’ problem). A solution that passes the onus of 
obtaining and proving clearance under non-standard conditions to users 
should avoid the additional costs which individually tailored licensing 
conditions would create for collective management bodies.74 
 
- Distributions should include a socio-cultural element (e.g. cross-subsidy 
big→small; investor→creator; mainstream→niche; foreign→domestic).  
This proposition is at variance with the Commission’s proposal to match 
distributions as closely as possible to actual use (and in particular improve the 
collecting and distribution for non-domestic right holders).  
 
Regarding re-distribution in favour of smaller right holders, an economic 
justification may be available: Collecting societies are bodies authors join 
                                                
73 The best-known initiative is Creative Commons (www.creativecommons.org). 
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before they know who will be successful. The collective administration of 
copyright then can be conceptualised as an insurance scheme.75 
  
With regard to the other proposed re-distributions, cultural arguments need to 
be mustered: It cannot be in the interest of countries whose consumers have 
come to rely heavily on (mostly) Anglo-American cultural imports, to 
perpetuate such a system by collecting and distributing domestic fees largely 
for the benefits of foreign right holders. Supporting a diverse domestic scene 
of cultural production is a legitimate aim of copyright policy, and a bias in the 





In this article, I have argued that the collective administration of copyrights should be 
conceived as an independent regulatory regime, ensuring access to and reward for 
creative materials. In pursuing these aims, policy makers should use the tools of 
competition law where they are available under current EC jurisprudence. Collecting 
societies are currently insufficiently accountable to society, and pursue many 
practices that are at variance with the aims of access and reward. Radical reform of 
their governance is needed. If collecting societies are to become facilitators of an 
information society, users will have to be represented in the supervisory structures, 
and tariffs and distribution rules need to be meaningfully reviewed in a public forum. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
74 In the medium term, DRM-type systems operating under the umbrella of collecting societies might 
become an alternative. The policy rule should be that right holders can alter blanket licensing 
conditions only in favour of more permissive use (this would address the ‘cherry-picking’ issue).  
75 This interesting point was made in Montreal by Prof. Richard Watt (Universidad Autónoma de 
Madrid; cf. A. Snow and R. Watt ‘Risk Sharing and the Distribution of Copyright Collective Income’, 
pp. 23-36 in L.N. Takeyama, W.J. Gordon and R. Towse Developments in the Economics of Copyright 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2005). New empirical data from a comparative survey of authors’ earnings 
in Germany and the UK shows that, currently, the distribution of collecting societies payments is more 
skewed than income from rights that are individually managed. For collecting society income, the top 
10 percent of writers receive about 60% (Germany) - 70%  (UK) of collecting society payments, while 
for total individual income from writing, the top 10 percent of writers account for 50% (Germany) - 
60% (UK) of total wealth – M. Kretschmer and P. Hardwick Authors’ Earnings from Copyright and 
Non-Copyright Sources: A Survey of 25,000 British and German Writers (London: ALCS 2007). If 
membership in a collecting society should act as risk mitigation, writers need to agree a ‘progressive’ 
re-distribution of wealth from higher to lower earners. 
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While governance rules are usefully regulated at Community level, the review of 
tariffs and distributions as far as possible must remain under domestic control. 
Member states ought to be able to express their diverse social and cultural priorities. 
However, where pan-European services make this impracticable (for example in the 
field of music), tariffs and distributions need to be supervised at pan-European level. 
As a first move, a public repository should be created of all collective management 
agreements with a European dimension, enabling public debate. As a second step, a 
European Copyright Board should be established under a constitution of Access and 
Reward (borrowing mechanisms from other regulated industries, such as utilities or 
broadcasting).76 The Board would be expected to develop jurisprudence on issues 
such as duty to contract, free use, socio-cultural deduction and so on.  
 
The European Courts, and recent interventions by the Commission have evaded the 
analytical choice between the rules of competition (applying competition law to an 
hitherto sheltered sector of economic activity) and a sui generis regulatory regime 
beyond the rules of competition (taking account of wider socio-cultural aims). This 
article has outlined the implications for a European information society. 
 
                                                
76 There is a tradition of contestable copyright tariffs particularly in the UK, Germany, Canada and the 
US. However, the remit of these quasi-judicial bodies tends to be narrow, with a standard of review 
seeking market emulation. 
